Monday, 22 October 2012

Senior Trader Suspended as RBS gets Tougher on LIBOR Scandal by Stuart Yeomans


The Royal Bank of Scotland has taken its most drastic action so far against traders involved in the LIBOR rigging scandal by suspending the most senior figure to date. The suspension of Jezri Mohideen, the head of rates for Europe and Asia Pacific, has come at a time when talk of huge fines for the Edinburgh-based bank. It is claimed Mr Mohideen instructed other traders to lower the submission of the LIBOR rate to strengthen the banks position in respective markets.

The most high-ranking staff member so far to become embroiled in the scandal which is sweeping the banking industry was considered by many as a high-flyer in the banking world and had been promoted to the head of rates for Europe and Asia back in 2010. The allegations stem from his previous role as head of Yen products in Tokyo.

          In an instant-message conversation recorded in 2007, two colleagues have alleged that Mohideen, instructed colleagues in the U.K. to lower RBS’s submission to yen Libor that day. So far no comment has been made by Mr Mohideen or RBS in relation to the suspension and the only comment made by a bank spokesman said: "Our investigations into submissions, communications and procedures relating to the setting of Libor and other interest rates are ongoing. RBS and its employees continue to cooperate fully with regulators". The suspension of Mr Mohideen could be the start of a more companywide witch-hunt for individuals who took part in the LIBOR-rigging scandal.

This follows the suspension of 7 other traders late last year, two of which have recently been re-instated by the bank and another Tan Chi Min – also known as Jimmy Tan- is suing the bank for wrongful dismissal. He claims the rate rigging was “systemic” in the bank, a claim that has been re-iterated by inside sources in recent months.

With Barclays Plc, Britain’s second-biggest lender by assets, paying a record £290 million ($466 million) fine in June it is expected RBS, 81% owned by the UK taxpayer, could exceed that amount for its involvement and many other banks are facing investigation.

This comes at a difficult time for RBS as shares fell 1% amid warnings from analysts that the bank would need to cut the price of the 316 branches it was planning to sell to Santander for £1.6bn.The sale, forced on RBS by Brussels as a result of the £45bn taxpayer bailout, fell through on Friday after more than two years of negotiations. The sale may now have to be completed at a cut-price £0.5bn- £1bn less than the deal agreed with Santander back in 2010.





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Does Indonesia need Policy Tightening? by Stuart Yeomans


Speedy economic growth, together with massive credit increases and deteriorating current accounts have spurred fears among many analysts that Indonesia’s economy may be overheating, which may see the central bank of Indonesia being forced to increase interest rates.

Indonesia has seen a sharp deterioration in its current account position over the past year. However, this is largely explained by a slump in foreign demand rather than an unsustainable consumer boom driving up imports. Large inflows of foreign direct investment mean the country should have few problems sustaining a deficit over the medium term. While credit is growing rapidly at the moment, strong credit growth in part reflects a period of catch-up after a prolonged period of deleveraging which followed the Asian financial crisis. In addition, unlike in Hong Kong and Vietnam, there is little evidence that strong lending growth is fuelling asset price bubbles. Most new lending is being directed to productive sectors of the economy.

The recent performance of the economy has certainly been impressive. In 2011, GDP grew at its fastest pace since the Asian financial crisis (1997-98), and the strong growth has continued into the first half of this year. However, strong growth on its own does not mean the economy is overheating. To determine whether the current impressive expansion is sustainable, let’s look at four main indicators: the current account; credit growth,; inflation; as well as our estimates of trend growth.

There has been a sharp and sudden deterioration in Indonesia’s current account position, which has been in deficit for the past three quarters. However, while a current account deficit can sometimes be a symptom of overheating, this does not have to be the case. The worsening of the current account is not the result of an unsustainable consumer boom driving up imports. Instead it is due mainly to a sharp fall in exports, which is the result of weaker global growth and falling prices for the goods that Indonesia sells abroad.

As a low-income, fast-growing economy with plenty of opportunities to invest, it arguably makes sense for Indonesia to be importing capital from the rest of the world (in other words, running a current account deficit). Moreover, while a current account deficit can be a source of instability, this is unlikely to be the case in Indonesia. Unlike the last time Indonesia ran a current account deficit in 1997, the country is much less dependent on volatile portfolio inflows to fund the deficit. As a result, Indonesia is much less vulnerable to a balance of payments crisis than it was 15 years ago.

Another possible sign of overheating is rapid credit growth, which is now expanding by 25% y/y – one of the fastest rates of growth in the region. Strong credit growth which is sustained over a number of years is certainly something the authorities need to keep an eye on. Indeed, rapid credit growth was one of the main causes of both the Asian financial crisis, as well as the problems that Vietnam is now experiencing. Recent rapid credit growth in Indonesia in part reflects a period of catch-up after a prolonged period of deleveraging which followed the Asian financial crisis. Credit as a share of GDP in Indonesia actually fell from over 60% in 1997 to less than 20% in 2000. In 2011, credit in Indonesia was still the equivalent to only 30% of GDP, one of the lowest levels in the region. In addition, as an economy develops and the financial sector becomes more sophisticated, it is normal and healthy for credit to grow faster than nominal GDP.

As important to how quickly credit has been growing is where the new lending has been directed. There is little evidence that strong credit growth in Indonesia is fuelling asset price bubbles. Whereas places such as Hong Kong and Vietnam have seen a surge of lending into property, only 8% of bank lending in Indonesia has been into property-related sectors. As a result, while property prices have massively outstripped wage growth in Hong Kong, prices in Indonesia are increasing at a much slower pace than incomes. In addition, the stock market is also showing little sign of excess. Since the start of the year the Jakarta Composite has moved roughly in line with trends in the rest of the region. Moreover, the current price-earnings ratio of the Indonesian stock market is broadly in line with its long-run average.

Consumer price inflation was just 4.6% y/y in August, and is comfortably within Bank Indonesia’s (BI) central 3.5-5.5% target range. Admittedly, inflation is likely to rise before the end of the year due mainly to rising food prices which are being pushed higher by unfavourable base effects. A good harvest and the suspension of some import duties on food helped to suppress food prices last year. However, the any spike in inflation is likely to be temporary, and is not a sign of economic overheating. Core inflation, which is a better guide to underlying inflationary pressures, has been stable and is likely to remain low.

Indonesia’s economy grew by 6.5% in 2011. Despite the downturn in global demand, growth in Indonesia has barely slowed, with GDP expanding by 6.4% year-on-year in the first half of 2012. This compares with average growth since 2001 of just over 5%. This on its own is not evidence of overheating. Increased political stability and a rising investment rate have all helped to boost trend growth in Indonesia, which is now estimated to be around 6.5%. In addition, capacity utilisation in Indonesia is not unusually high, and is broadly in line with the average level of the last few years.

There also seems little danger of a wage-price spiral developing in Indonesia. Limitations with the data make it difficult to form firm conclusions, but wages appear to be increasing slowly. Meanwhile, a relatively high unemployment rate suggests there is still plenty of slack in the labour market.

Considering all of the evidence, it is rather unlikely that Indonesia’s economy is overheating. As a result there is little urgency for Bank Indonesia to tighten monetary policy. Indeed, given the poor outlook for global demand and the likelihood that the crisis in the euro-zone will worsen again soon, we believe interest rates in Indonesia will remain at their current record low level for the rest of this year and next. That being said, a further significant deterioration in the current account or a step-up in credit growth may see policy tightening.



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Greece Future in the “EURO” by Stuart Yeomans


With the recently announced fiscal methods to generate USD 17.5bn of savings required by the Troika, Greece has inched closer to securing its next loan from its bailout package. However, this may not be sufficient to secure Greece’s long term future within the debt stricken euro-zone.

The fiscal methods which are to be introduced over the next few years were agreed after weeks of bickering between the Government’s three coalition partners. Most of the incomes are to be generated by a decrease in spending which will come from reductions in pension payments and public sector salaries. The announcement has been significant, as Greece has not secured its next payment.

Adjustment, austerity and consolidation of Greece’s fiscal position have to be done gradually because any drastic prescription or conditionality would drive the country into a new phase of economic recession. Drastic measures would increase the cost to the economy and make recovery potential more remote.

International Monetary Fund (IMF) chief Christian Lagarde recently said Greece should at least be given another two years to reach its budget goals, arguing that the euro-zone should not blindly stick to tough budget deficit targets if growth weakened more than expected.

As for the recently announced methods to generate savings, the Troika may query 15% of the suggested cuts, which may delay the disbursement of the next loan tranche. The Troika will also need to be convinced that all other requirements they have demanded are en route. Furthermore, the Troika have insisted that all promised fiscal measures are being implemented before it disburses all the money.

However, having secured its next instalment may not necessarily mean that the uncertainty of Greece’s long term future in the single currency will be put to an end. The worsening in the growth outlook this year means that the economic assumptions on which the rescue package was initially based are now much too optimistic, leaving a hole in the finances of the bail-out package.

The budget assumes that the hole for next year is pretty small, perhaps just €1bn. Despite a sharp downward revision to the economic growth forecast – GDP is expected to contract by 3.8% next year rather than stagnate – the Government only expects the primary surplus to be 0.7% of GDP lower than the 1.8% of GDP target set out in the original bail-out plans. Note that the gap would have been larger if the size of the fiscal package had not been increased by €2bn. If GDP “growth” was even weaker, the financing gap for 2013 and 2014 could be rather larger, particularly if the privatisation programme generated less revenue than expected.

The bigger worry though, is that the more pessimistic GDP growth and budget deficit forecasts have led the Government to raise the public debt to GDP ratio forecast to 179% next year, far higher than the forecast of 167% in the original bail-out programme.

This could have major implications for the IMF’s involvement in the bail-out since, in principle, it will only lend to governments if the deal is expected to reduce the recipient government’s public debt to a sustainable level.

Indeed, this latest development could prompt the Fund to up the pressure on the ECB and/or euro-zone governments to agree to some sort of official sector debt restructuring, something which the ECB and most core governments are fiercely resistant to. In all, the longer-term future of the bail-out remains far from certain.



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The Eurozone and its Snail Pace


Economic confidence in the Euro-area decreased more than economists forecast to the lowest in almost three years in July, suggesting the economic slump extended into the third quarter as governments struggled to tame the debt crisis.  According to a report by the European Commission in Brussels, the index of executive and consumer sentiment in the 17-nation Euro-area dropped to 87.9 from 89.9 in June. That’s the lowest since September 2009. The Bloomberg News survey showed economists had forecasted a drop to 88.9, which is the median of 206 estimates. The debt turmoil which the European governments are struggling to contain, has undermined confidence and has forced Spain and Cyprus to seek external aid. Stuart Yeomans
On July 26th, shortly after Moody’s Investors Service put a negative outlook on Germany’s Aaa rating which caused the borrowing cost from Spain and Italy to surge to record highs, European Central Bank (ECB) President Mario Draghi had announced that policy makers would do whatever was needed to preserve the threatened currency. The Euro has depreciated by over 7% against the US dollar over the past three months after Spain in June asked for a loan amounting to 100 billion Euros to bail out its banks. Stuart Yeomans
In a report compiled by Moody’s, they cited that Greece could leave the Euro and there is an increasing likelihood that nations such as Spain and Italy would require additional support. Stuart Yeomans
With governments seeking ways to plug their budget deficits, the economy is edging towards its second recession in four years. Europe’s largest economy has grown more pessimistic as German’s business confidence in July fell to the lowest in the last two years and more than what economists had expected. On 16th July, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), reduced the Euro-area growth forecast for 2013 to 0.7% from 0.9% and said that the gross domestic product will drop 0.3% in 2012. The IMF had also cut its global growth forecast for 2013. Stuart Yeomans
Sentiments among European manufactures continued to look gloomy with the indicator of manufacturing confidence index falling to minus 15 from minus 12.8 in June. An indicator of services confidence dropped to minus 8.5 from minus 7.4, while a gauge of consumer sentiments fell to minus 21.5 from minus 19.8. Confidence in the construction sector has also continued to deteriorate. Stuart Yeomans
Economic data in Asia also showed weaknesses in the manufacturing industry. Japan’s industrial output unexpectedly declined and South Korean manufacturer’s confidence dropped to a three year low. Stuart Yeomans
According to a Bloomberg survey, the European Central Bank is expected to keep its benchmark rate at 0.75% when the council members meet on the 2nd August. In June, the Frankfurt based central bank had reduced borrowing costs to a record low. Stuart Yeomans
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